TENNESSEE SHOULD INCORPORATE DEFAULT PROVISIONS INTO LLC OPERATING AGREEMENTS TO SAFEGUARD UNSOPHISTICATED PARTIES AND FUTURE GENERATIONS by Ferrell, Jordan
 
259 
TENNESSEE SHOULD INCORPORATE 
DEFAULT PROVISIONS INTO LLC 
OPERATING AGREEMENTS TO SAFEGUARD 
UNSOPHISTICATED PARTIES  
AND FUTURE GENERATIONS 
Jordan Ferrell*
In his essay, Professor Douglas K. Moll identifies and explains the 
similarities that closely held limited liability companies (“LLCs”) share 
with closely held corporations.1 In fact, he believes the two entities are so 
alike in their vulnerabilities to minority owner oppression that he refers to 
them collectively as closely-held enterprises or businesses.2 Professor Moll 
goes through pain-staking effort to describe the issues and concerns of  
corporate minority owner oppression. He then explains how corporate 
law, over time, has managed to address these problems by providing 
manageable solutions through legislative and judicial means. Additionally, 
Professor Moll describes the issues facing minority owners of  an LLC, 
which share striking parallels with corporate minority shareholders. Finally, 
he connects all of  the dots when he reveals his proposed solution to solve 
minority LLC owner oppression by importing the well-developed 
corporate solutions into the LLC realm, thus placing both entities under 
the same umbrella of  minority protection.  
Professor Moll’s thesis is that as the problem of  minority oppression 
is “portable” between the two entities so too should be the solutions.3 
State legislatures and courts need not birth a completely new doctrine 
(with the attached growing pains) to deal with minority owner oppression 
in an LLC because those same legislatures and courts have already labored 
to create the same protections provided to minority corporate 
 
* Jordan Ferrell is a JD/MBA Candidate at The University of  Tennessee. He wishes 
to thank Professors George Kuney, Joan Heminway, and Eric Amarante for their 
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1 Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or 
Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 885 (2005). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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shareholders.4 In other words, Professor Moll declares that legislatures and 
courts have already successfully endeavored to protect minority owners in 
the corporate setting; consequently, instead of  reinventing the wheel over 
the next two decades, they simply need to apply that corporate standard 
to LLCs by establishing default provisions and subsequent case law to 
support an oppression doctrine.5  
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MINORITY OPPRESSION  
IN THE CORPORATE SETTING 
Minority corporate shareholders face exposure to two major concerns: 
a lack of  exit rights and the effects of  majority control.6 First, a lack of  
exit rights results in the “effective confiscation of  the minority’s 
investment,” because closely-held corporate minority owners: (1) possess 
no ready/open markets, resulting in a lack of  liquidity (i.e. ownership 
interests cannot be sold at a fair price, even if  a fair price could be 
reasonably determined; a minority interest is also less desirable and less 
valuable due to lack of  control); (2) are incapable of  preventing the 
majority from choices that harm the owners’ interests; and (3) suffer their 
invested capital being trapped in the entity while the majority decides how 
it is used.7 
Second, in addition to financial expectations, members have 
participatory expectations due to the likelihood that closely-held 
corporations employ their members/owners who look to this employment 
for their financial security.8 Similarly, majority rule may also have a drastic 
effect on a minority member’s ability to participate in the business of  the 
corporation. Some of  the risks to minority corporate shareholders include: 
(1) termination of  the minority’s employment; (2) removal of  the minority 
from management; and (3) exclusion of  the minority from profits of  the 
venture.9 
Majority rule will be able to terminate the member’s employment and 
eliminate that particular income stream, remove the member from the 
board of  directors, the C-suite, or mid-level management, and finally, 
 
4 See Anderson v. Wilder, No. E200602647COAR3CV, 2007 WL 2700068, at *3 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2007). 
5 Moll, supra note 1, at 883. 
6 Id. at 884, 896. 
7 Id. at 896, 899 
8 Id. at 883–84. 
9 Id. at 884. 
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separate those shareholders from any voice in how corporate profits are 
allocated. With their financial rights essentially held captive, and now being 
effectively sidelined from participating in the corporation’s normal 
business, minority shareholders are basically completely ostracized from 
any level of  control in the fate or direction of  the corporation or their 
capital investment. 
II. WHY CORPORATE PROTECTIONS  
SHOULD APPLY TO LLCS 
To understand how similar minority owners in closely-held 
corporations and LLCs are, simply substitute the term “LLC” for 
“corporate/corporation” and all else applies nearly the same according to 
Professor Moll.10 Over the last few decades, with the ability to customize 
more adeptly than a corporation and at the same time enjoy pass-through 
taxation like a partnership, the LLC has become the preferred choice of  
business entity on an exponential scale.11 The sheer increase in volume of  
LLCs being formed in comparison to corporations is one of  the main 
justifications for calls for courts and legislatures to designate protections 
for LLCs, just as they do for corporations.12  
States that do not provide default provisions that create possible exits 
for owners leave unprotected those parties who are either unsophisticated, 
second-generation, or who avoided the understandably uncomfortable 
conversations during the honeymoon phases of  formation. As such, these 
unfortunate parties lack the ability to liquidate their capital investment, are 
unable to prevent the majority from taking actions that damage the entity 
or minority owners, and are basically trapped into the LLC with no 
recourse or remedy.13 
Professor Moll claims that half  of  states’ LLC laws default to voting 
on a per capita basis (one vote per member) while the other half  default 
to voting on a pro rata basis (vote by financial interest).14 Voting by a pro 
rata basis assures majority control via financial interest. Thus, minority 
oppression is possible; however, even a per capita basis is susceptible to 
minority oppression should multiple members form a coalition, or voting 
 
10 Id. at 926. 
11 Id. at 885–86. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 896 
14 Id. at 941–42. 
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block, that ostracizes the minority member.15 Courts have discovered 
incidents of  minority oppression in the corporate setting when a 
controlling group exerts power on an aggregate level; therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the same may occur in LLCs.16 
III. MINORITY OPPRESSION PROTECTION MIGRATES  
FROM MASSACHUSETTS TO TENNESSEE 
In fact, Tennessee courts agree with Professor Moll’s views and are 
applying corporate majority shareholders’ fiduciary duties to the minority 
to LLCs. The pathway from the same standard of  fiduciary duty for 
partnerships being recognized in LLCs required three decades and a 
journey from Massachusetts to Tennessee. First, we must look to 
Massachusetts where, in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of  New England, the 
Supreme Judicial Court discovered the fundamental similarities between 
partnerships and closely held corporations, most notably the inherent risk 
to minority corporate shareholders.17 The court held that those 
shareholders in close corporations owe the exact same fiduciary duty owed 
between partners and that the standard of  fiduciary duty owed between 
partners is that of  the “utmost good faith and loyalty.”18 One year later, 
the same court affirmed its holding and rationale in Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc.19 
The next step in the journey to achieve minority LLC owner 
protection in Tennessee required two decades occurring in Nelson v. Martin 
where the Tennessee Supreme Court approved of  Wilkes and the 
reasoning behind protecting the minority corporate shareholder from 
majority rule.20 The final step occurred a decade later in Anderson v. Wilder 
 
15 Id. at 943–44. 
16 Id. at 944. 
17 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975). 
18 Id. (citing Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952)). 
19 See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc, 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976). 
20 Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tenn. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds 
by Trau-Med of  Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 699 (Tenn. 2002) (citing F. 
Hodge O’Neal and Robert Thompson, O’Neals Oppression of  Minority Shareholders § 10:04, 
at 16 (2d ed. 1995)). In spite of  the traditional adherence to majority rule and the business 
judgment rule, many courts in this country have moved steadily toward providing a 
remedy for oppressed minority shareholders. Some courts have made clear that they will 
not apply the business judgment rule unless the directors not only have acted in good 
faith, but also have exercised proper care, skill, and diligence. For many courts, the 
response has been to impose a fiduciary duty on the controlling shareholders for the 
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where the Tennessee Court of  Appeals applied the corporate standard set 
forth by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Nelson to LLCs.21 Upon analysis 
of  Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-240-102, the court held that “[a] majority 
shareholder of  an LLC stands in a fiduciary relationship to the minority, 
similar to the Supreme Court's teaching in Nelson regarding a corporation, 
is warranted in this case. Such a holding does not conflict with the statute, 
and is in keeping with the statutory requirement that each LLC member 
discharge all of  his or her duties in good faith.”22 
IV. ARGUMENT AGAINST CREATING DEFAULT PROVISIONS FOR LLCS: 
LLCS ARE GOVERNED BY CONTRACT LAW 
The law surrounding LLCs is renowned to be primarily contract law.23 
This allows for the advantageous ability for parties to customize (within 
reason) their respective LLC to meet their needs as they see fit. TCA § 48-
240-102(g) grants a wide berth for parties to draft their articles or 
operating agreement to suit their needs and customize the terms to “reflect 
the understanding of  the parties” as long as the terms are not manifestly 
 
benefit of  minority interests. Courts increasingly have been willing to recognize an 
enhanced fiduciary duty among shareholders in a close corporation. Id.  
21 Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2006-02647-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2700068, at *3 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2007). 
22 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-240-102(a)–(b) (2019). The statute states:  
(a) Fiduciary Duty of  Members of  Member-Managed LLC. Except as provided 
in the articles or operating agreement, every member of  a member-managed 
LLC must account to the LLC for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any 
profits derived by the member without the consent of  the other members from 
any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of  the 
LLC or from any use by the member of  its property including, but not limited 
to, confidential or proprietary information of  the LLC or other matters 
entrusted to the member as a result of  such person’s status as a member.  
(b) Standard of  Conduct. A member of  a member-managed LLC shall 
discharge such member’s duties as a member, including all duties as a member 
of  a committee:  
(1) In good faith;  
(2) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
exercise under similar circumstances; and  
(3) In a manner the member reasonably believes to be in the best interest 
of  the LLC. 
Id.; Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *6 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003). 
23 Moll, supra note 1, at 920. 
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unreasonable.24 Tennessee common law subjects parties to a duty of  good 
faith and fair dealing in the performance of  contracts.25 In TSC Industries, 
Inc. v. Tomlin, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals declared, “It is true that 
there is implied in every contract a duty of  good faith and fair dealing in 
its performance and enforcement, and a person is presumed to know the 
law.”26  
Professor George Kuney argues that this freedom of  navigation 
concerning terms that govern LLCs and subsequent reliance on the duty 
of  good faith and fair dealing are sufficient for all parties to be protected.27 
He favors a system that requires organizers, while drafting the LLC’s 
terms, to enter into the negotiations with their eyes wide open because 
they and their successors shall be held accountable to their contracting 
choices.28 Professor Kuney recommends that organizing members should 
plan accordingly while drafting their operating agreements and keep in 
mind that future generations along with heirs apparent will be bound by 
those terms.29   
The aspect of  LLC law that Professor Kuney prefers, the complete 
freedom to contract, is one that Professor Joan Heminway counsels to 
reign in to a certain degree. She would prefer that LLCs not be allowed to 
contract away all fiduciary duties due to a possible lack of  sophistication 
of  the parties or attorneys.30 Otherwise, parties may surrender powers and 
protections that they may never be able to bargain back. 
 
24 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-240-102(g) (2019). “Modification of  Standard of  Conduct 
in Articles or Operating Agreement. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this 
section, the articles or operating agreement may define the standard of  conduct in a 
manner to reflect the understanding of  the parties provided such definition is not 
manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances.” Id.  
25 Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of  Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1996). 
26 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Tomlin, 743 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). 
27 George Kuney, Lindsay Young Distinguished Professor of  Law, University of  Tennessee 
College of  Law Continued Legal Education: Connecting the Threads (Sept. 27, 2019), 
https://www.rev.com/transcript-editor/Edit?token=MNMJQHP7LQe5vbvLdznMzku
baNhw0AuzbIB-RfdMqJz_sMBvRGNqraFiAlILoL0NDR-Of-s54AtmnqKtG7ecD6jY
OHg&loadFrom=DeliveryEmail&openShareModal=False&page=1&sortBy=Uploade
d&sortOrder=Desc&pageSize=25. 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Joan Heminway, Limited Partnership Law: Should Tennessee Follow Delaware’s Lead on 
Fiduciary Duty Private Ordering?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Sept. 5, 2016), https://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/business_law/2016/09/limited-partnership-law-should-tennessee-follow-
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTION OF INCLUDING DEFAULT PROVISIONS IN THE 
TENNESSEE RULLCA  
A. Buy/Sell Provisions in LLC Operating Agreements 
The LLC statutes make clear that the legislature’s intent, and one of  
the greatest advantages of  the LLC form, is to remove restrictive 
corporate requirements in favor of  a greater degree of  latitude in which 
the individual LLC may operate within.31 However, to accomplish that 
greater freedom, the LLC organizers must contractually draft the rules that 
it will operate by, i.e. the operating agreement.32 In order to do that 
successfully, the organizers must plan for the worst. Professor Moll cites 
advance planning as a weakness in closely held enterprises.33  
Whether the onus behind a lack of  advance planning for dissension is 
attributed to “over-trust” based on familial/friendship relationships or a 
lack of  sophistication of  the parties, the same result occurs in that when 
dissension suddenly appears, minority owners find themselves beholden 
to the majority, and worse yet, lacking an exit route.34 Fear of  damaging 
those aforementioned relationships makes “hard bargaining” more 
uncomfortable for the parties (who are likely currently on very pleasant 
terms at the inception of  the LLC, otherwise, the parties would not be 
binding themselves together) than if  the LLC was not closely held, and 
instead, more “arms-length.”35 Similar to a hypothetical pre-nuptial 
agreement in all marriage licenses, the existence of  default rules that plan 
for dissension and lay out exit strategies would serve to protect parties that 
seek to avoid confrontation during the initial honeymoon phase of  LLC 
formation. A default buy/sell provision in the operating agreement would 
protect unsophisticated parties or attorneys from their own ignorance. 
LLCs are relatively simple entities to form and, undoubtedly, numerous 
LLCs are formed by parties who do not understand what they are doing 
 
delawares-lead-on-fiduciary-duty-private-ordering.html. Although Professor Heminway’s 
post is directed toward limited partnerships, the concepts may be applied to LLCs the 
same. 
31 Moll, supra note 1, at 958. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 952. 
34 Id. at 952. 
35 Id. at 954. 
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or are represented by legal counsel that is equally inept, either through a 
lack of  education, experience, or mentor networks.36  
B. Sunset Provisions in LLC Operating Agreements 
MBCA jurisdictions allow for shareholder agreements to possess ten-
year sunset provisions to protect minority shareholders.37 Sunset 
provisions are those that exist for a defined term before they expire, unless 
they are revived by whatever standards in the chartering documents 
specify. Similarly, voting trusts may be agreed to for periods of  up to 10 
years before a mandatory expiration.38 The renewal of  these provisions 
might require unanimity, and should that fail, that particular provision will 
fall away and the LLC will default to the applicable statutes. The presence 
of  sunset provisions in Tennessee LLC law would serve two purposes by 
protecting: 1) unsophisticated parties from drafting mistakes or omissions, 
and 2) future generations and contingent heirs-apparent from being bound 
by terms they had no voice in drafting. In essence, parties can contract 
away from the default rules as they see fit and then revisit those decisions 
every 10 years, allowing the benefit of  experience or the introduction of  
new parties to determine if  those provisions are renewed. 
Professor Kuney believes that parties are or should be sophisticated 
enough to contract the terms by which they will live under, and that they 
should draft with the foresight that future generations of  owners will also 
be bound to those terms. I believe that expectation, coupled with the 
presumption in TSC Industries, Inc. that all parties know the law, assumes 
too much from the countless parties that join together to form LLCs, as 
well as their chosen counsel. LLCs are relatively easy to form and 
undoubtedly, some parties form an LLC without knowing what they are 
doing. Even if  they seek legal counsel, the quality of  that counsel will 
depend on the attorney’s education, experience level, and mentor network.  
It is much fairer to contingent parties who at some point will be bound 
by those contracted terms, but who never had a voice in their drafting due 
to, for example, receiving ownership in the LLC as a testamentary gift. 
Property law displays the law’s aversion to “dead hand control” with 
several doctrines that protect the living above the dead. The existence of  
 
36 Eric Franklin, A Rational Approach to Business Entity Choice, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 573, 
595–96 (2016). 
37 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(b)(3) (2003). 
38 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.30 (2003). 
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sunset provisions as default LLC rules would serve to protect future 
generations and contingent heirs-apparent from control from the grave.  
CONCLUSION 
Based on what I have learned from speaking to esteemed professors 
at the University of  Tennessee and the University of  Houston, Douglas 
Moll, George Kuney, Joan Heminway, and Eric Amarante, I would 
recommend the inclusion of  certain default statutes, including buy/sell 
agreements and 10-year sunset provisions, in all LLC operating 
agreements. I believe this choice is advantageous because: (1) not all 
parties, or their legal counsel, are sophisticated enough to protect minority 
members from omissions or the unknown; (2) future generations and 
contingent heirs-apparent enjoy some level of  protection once they have 
a seat at the table; and (3) it also allows for organizing members to avoid 
uncomfortable conversations during the honeymoon phase about possible 
future dissension while still protecting their respective interests.  
A system of  default rules where the parties also have a wide latitude 
to contract their terms is likely the best environment in which current 
minority owners can possess exit rights to activate their liquidity and 
protect their capital investments, while also protecting the interests of  
future generations who do not yet have a seat at the drafting table. 
